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PoLICE POWER-RIGIIT TO MAINTAIN ROADBLOCK-DISPLAY OF DRIVERs
LICENSE ON DEAN.-Defendant was cited to quarterly court for dnv-
ing a motor vehicle without a driver's license. She had been stopped at
a roadblock by state police who were indiscriminately stopping all
drivers to determine if they had a license in their possession as required
by statute.' The quarterly court dismissed the charge on the ground
that defendant's constitutional right of liberty had been violated by an
illegal arrest or restraint, and that the evidence obtained thereby was
inadmissible. This was affirmed by the circuit court. On appeal, the
Commonwealth sought a certification of the law with respect to the
right and power of police officers to set up roadblocks for the sole
purpose of stopping motorists and requiring display of their operator's
license. Held: Law certified. Stopping drivers at a road block for the
sole purpose of checking their operators licenses is a reasonable exercise
of the police powers and not an invasion of the individual's constitu-
tional freedoms. Evidence that the defendant was operating a motor
vehicle without an operators license is admissible, since it is not the
product of an illegal search. Commonwealth v Mitchell, 355 S.W.2d
686 (Ky. 1962).
This case was one of first impression for the Kentucky court on the
constitutionality of stopping vehicles at a roadblock without probable
cause to believe that any particular driver was unlicensed. Like Ken-
tucky, most states have a statute requiring operators to display a license
upon demand by a peace officer.2 Seldom do such display statutes set
out the circumstances under which display can be demanded and there
is a genuine lack of case law on the point.3 The court relied on a
1959 Florida case, City of Miami v Aronovitz,4 which appears to be the
first case dealing with the constitutionality of roadblocks. The facts and
issues in that case were similar to those in the principal case, the only
difference being that the driver who was stopped had his license and
brought the action to enjoin the roadblock operation. The Florida
lKy. Rev. Stat. 186.510 [hereinafter cited, as KlES] provides: "The li-
censee shall have his license m his possession at all times when driving a motor
vehicle and shall display it upon demand to a peace officer, a member of the
State Highway Patro or [other specified individuals]."2 E.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 9 5%, §6-118 (1958); Ind. Ann. Stat. §47-2714(b)
(Supp. 1962); Olo Rev. Code Ann. §4507.85 (1954); Tenn. Code Ann. §59-709(Supp. 1962); Va. Code Ann. §46.1-7(c) (1958); W. Va. Code Ann. §1721(217)(1961).
3 A possible explanation .for lack of case law was offered by the court in
United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) where cars had
been stopped at a check point and questioned briefly, the court said: 'I believe
that the relative dearth -o authority in point can be explained by the fact that
few litigants have senously contended that it was illegal for an officer to stop
and question a person unless he had probable cause for a formal arrest."
4114 So. 2d-784 (Fla. 1959).
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court also held that such roadblocks are a reasonable and necessary
exercise of the police powers.
In determining whether enforcing the licensing statutes by the
use of roadblocks should be permitted, the courts are faced with three
overlapping questions. First, is the stopping an arrest or illegal restraint?
Second, if considered an arrest or an arrest follows, is it necessary to
have specific probable cause to stop the driver? Third, assuming such
a stopping is permissible, is an attendance search and seizure also
permissible?
In the pnncipal case the court dealt rather summarily with the
question of whether the stopping constituted an arrest or illegal
restraint by stating that the uplifted hand of the officer cannot be
thought of as an arrest. This seems to express the prevailing rule,5
but there was no further explanation by the court. The Aronovitz case
approaches the problem from the established position that when a
license is issued, its recipient takes it under the condition that he will
comply with reasonable regulations of the road. This being true,
stopping at a roadblock becomes one more reasonable duty he must
perform and certainly could not be considered an arrest. Kentucky
recognizes this doctnne,6 but it was not applicable in the pnncipal case
because the driver was unlicensed.
At common law, it is well settled that there can be no valid arrest
and no subsequent search without a showing that the arresting officer
had probable cause to believe an offense had been cimmitted. In the
motor vehicle cases this has generally meant commission of a traffic
violation in the officer's presence. The Aronovitz decision adopts the
somewhat unique approach of general probable cause,7 I.e., it is
statistically known that a certain percentage of drivers are dnving with-
out a license, and therefore there is probable cause to believe that
some of the dnvers stopped will be violators of the licensing statute.
In the pnncipal case the court said nothing specifically on this
subject but pointed out that if police officers are not permitted to stop
dnvers and check thcir licenses the objective of safety on the highways
would be greatly hindered. The clear effect of this decision is to
5 Annot., 143 A.L.R. 1019 (1943); Annot., 154 A.L.R. 812 (1945). United
States v. Bonanno, 180 F Supp. 71 (1960) states substantially that officers have
the nght to stop vehicles reasonably and temporarily to question the occupants on
grounds that might not be enough for a formal arrest; State v. Williams, 116
S.E.2d 858 (S.C. 1960) recognizes that the nght of a patrolman to stop a car
for the purpose of reqmnng the dnver to exhibit his license has never been
questioned. See generally Restatement, Torts §36, comment d (1934).
6Sturgill v. Beard, 303 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. 1957); Ballow v. Reeves, 238
S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1951); Commonwealth v. Hams, 278 Ky. 218, 128 S.W.2d 579
(1939).
7 3 Wash. U.L.Q. 279, 282 (1960).
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eliminate the probable cause requirement for a stopping under the
Kentucky display statute. This is somewhat of a departure from the
court's past decisions,8 but has been recognized elsewhere.9 The dangers
of such broad powers to detain motorists seem limited only by the
officer's good faith, in using this procedure to check licenses and not
for some unsanctioned purpose.10
The Kentucky court has held on numerous occasions that officers
have the right to search an automobile after making a lawful arrest of
the driver," and it is clear that they may arrest or issue a citation for a
violation of the display statute.12 Therefore, upon the officer's discovery
of the driver's inability to display license, presumably the officer may
search the driver's vehicle and his person. There was no formal arrest
and no search in the pnncipal case; however, the court restated the
rule presented in Cox v State, 3 a 1944 Tennessee case. In that case
the Tennessee court held that to stop a driver under the pretext of
requinng display of his license which in reality was for an ultenor
purpose would be an illegal stoppage and any search conducted
would be illegal within the constitutional safeguards.
Although sound in theory, the rule announced in the Cox case
carries with it the attendant danger that over-zealous officers, in their
attempt to enforce the law, may carry their procedures too far and
force dnvers to submit to embarrassing and unnecessary searches.
Recognizing this danger, at least one state has drafted its display
statute so that no charge can be made under it within five days after
apprehension.'- Since there can be no formal arrest at the time of
apprehension, presumably any attendant search would be illegal.
Under the Kentucky display statute, a later production of the license
will constitute a defense. However, this would not affect the validity
of the arrest or any search made at that time.
8In Marsh v. Commonwealth, 255 Ky. 484, 485, 74 S.W.2d 943 (1934)
the court said: "We have consistantly held that it is unlawful for an officer to
hold up a citizen on the ughway for a search of his portable possessions without
a search warrant or unless an offense has been committed in his presence.'
9 Brinigar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); United States v. Bonanno,
180 F Supp. 71 (1960); Iowa Code Ann. §321.492 (1949).
10 A Kentucky Attorney General's Oplmon lends support to this contention.
In response to a question of whether a police officer may stop a single motonst to
check Is license when there is no roadblock and the officer has not observed a
violation, the Attorney General said of the prncipal case: "The holding of the
case does not extend to the facts you present but the opinion indicates that the
test would be the good faith of the officer." 62 Ops. Att'y Gen. 359 (1962).
21 Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.2d 445 (Ky. 1950); Commonwealth
v. Chapman, 807 Ky. 680, 211 S.W.2d 841 (1948); Barnes v. Commonwealth, 305
Ky. 481, 204 S.W.2d 801 (1947); Combs v. Commonwealth, 271 Ky. 794, 113
S.W.2d 488 (1938).
12 KRS 431.015.
13 181 Tenn. 844, 181 S.W.2d 888 (1944).
14 Ind. Ann. Stat. §47-2714 (Sulm. 1962).
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Kentucky, unlike some other states,15 has not limited the authority
to halt drivers under the display statutes to the state police. It seems
that this would be further protection. Due to the superior training
and selection practices employed by that agency, as well as their
uniform operation and statewide control, these officers should be less
likely to conduct an illegal search.
In the pnncipal case the court was confronted with the problem
of balancing relative interests. On one hand was the question of
whether to encroach on the liberties and freedoms of motonsts; on the
other was the question of how to make the highways safer for motorists.
It seems that a sound decision was reached by the court. As a result of
modem vehicle operation, thousands of lives and dollars are lost an-
nually on the public highways largely because of incapable drivers.
Presumably, many of these incapable drivers are unlicensed. If these
dnvers are excluded from driving on the highways, this will have the
effect of reducing the number of highway accidents.
The effect of the holding in the pnncipal case is to impose
another of a growing number of restraints upon a citizen's nght to free
movement.16 While it may be only a minor inconvenience in most
instances, the present Kentucky statutory provisions allow a possibility
for the arbitrary and unrcasonable exercise of police powers. To curtail
this possibility, it seems that the display statute should be re-drafted to
include a short time period before charges can be brought under it and
to limit the authority to set-up these road blocks to the Kentucky State
Police.
H. Hamilton Rice, Jr
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN EMPLOY-
MENT CORONARY OccLUSION.-Claimant, employed as a loader operator
in a coal mine, became ill while at work. He was having difficulty
breathing because of smoke blown upward through the mine spaces
from a burning cable. An ensuing examination disclosed artenosclerosis
and a myocardial in farction, but this heart condition had developed
over a number of years. The claimant offered medical testimony that
the smoke from the burning cable and the stress of the work tnggered
the attack. The defense offered medical testimony that this heart
attack would have or could have occurred irrespective of the stress, but
did not deny that the work or conditions under which it was performed
15 See Tenn. Code Ann. §59-709 (Supp. 1962).16Another example of restraint upon freedom of movement can be found in
KRS 433.236 which allows a peace officer or a merchant to detain one
whom he has probable cause to believe is a shoplifter.
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